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ABSTRACT: The concept of morality underpins the moral responsibility that not only depends on
the outward practices (or ‘output’, in the case of humanoid robots) of the agents but on the internal
attitudes (‘input’) that rational and responsible intentioned beings generate. The primary question
that has initiated extensive debate, i.e. ‘Can humanoid robots be moral?’, stems from the norma-
tive outlook where morality includes human conscience and socio-linguistic background. This
paper advances the thesis that the conceptions of morality and creativity interplay with linguistic
human beings instead of non-linguistic humanoid robots, as humanoid robots are indeed docile
automata that cannot be responsible for their actions. To eradicate human ethics in order to make
way for humanoid robot ethics highlights the moral actions and adequacy that hinges the myth of
creative agency and self-dependency, which a humanoid robot can scarcely express.
KEY WORDS:  Humanoid robots · Morality · Responsibility · Docility · Artificial intelligence ·
 Conscience · Consciousness
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INTRODUCTION
This paper begins with prolegomena on the claim
of the interrelated nature of moral agency and ethical
conscience. Who can be a ‘moral agent’? The simple
answer would be a conscious ‘human being’ who has
moral conscience (the sense of right and wrong) and
who intends to act morally following rules and con-
duct. Morality supervenes on rational agency. Ration-
ality and consciousness are the necessary properties
of moral agency that should be guided by responsi-
bilities. Moral responsibility is not only an outward
practice but a feeling generated by the intentional
states of mind. In line with the query, the most promi-
nent question that has engendered a tremendous
debate in the history of moral ethics is whether moral
values are subjective or objective. This is a vexing
issue involving vast areas of study. Morality identifies
in ascribed conduct and particular codes that are
mutually followed by members of society. It is inter-
esting to consider that values are much closer to the
general features of the objects that an agent can
favour or disfavour from different contexts and situa-
tions. Moral values seem subject-centric, as they
depend on the rationality and conscience of the par-
ticular agent. Moral values are subjective, as they
differ according to the different intentions, motiva-
tions and choices of individuals. Subjective value is
reliant on our method of valuing or judging of it. Sub-
jective morality is closer to a ‘knowing how’ process
(in an epistemic sense) where moral values depend
on the agent’s skills and uses. Thus, a moral value
becomes context sensitive, or relative, since a subject
can accept a moral judgement as being right at a par-
ticular time and in a given context, but according to
the change of time and context, s/he can view the
same moral judgement as being wrong (Chakraborty
2017).
If we make a reasonable observation of the idea of
objectivity, then it is noticeable that although our
knowledge of the external world is prejudiced by
subjective experiences, it still remains objective. This
is because knowledge of the external world is open
to ‘inter-subjective’ verification and agreements.
Moral values are based on universalisability and pro-
vide inalienable conditions that firmly stand for the
objectivity of moral values. The principle of univer-
salisability attains a strong position here. Moreover,
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moral values are objective because moral values are
valued and agreed upon by all people across a num-
ber of cultures, and universalisability has some uni-
versal applicability (Mackie 1977). The parameter of
morality depends on the universalistic sense that is
called the prescriptive mould of morality. David
Hume, for example, held that the prescriptive term
‘ought’ cannot be deduced from a descriptive prem-
ise like ‘is’ that sounds more factual (Stove 1978).
Hume’s inducibility thesis of an ethical statement
based on the factual proclamation may be a fantasy.
We can deduce ‘ought’ conclusions from factual sen-
tences like ‘Any moral act is permissible’, for instance.
One can argue that some natural principles may
determine our moral values. A wide range of scien-
tific proclamations maintains the distinction between
fact and value (Putnam 2002, Chakraborty 2018). The
objective ground-based science aims to restrict any
subject-centric value in its theorems, but the ‘inescapa-
bility value-laden’ hypothesis of Graham (1981) em -
phasises an intertwined relationship between sci-
ence and ethics. The conception of autonomy of
science mingles in the realm of ethics because of its
applicability in our moral and social life. Scientific
values prop up social orders in a universalistic sense.
A deformity arises when we claim that one can only
derive moral values from the objective set of natural
principles, as without the conscious being or rational
agents, the conception of morality does not exist.
Only rational human beings can think about morality
and behave accordingly.
Traditionally taken as an aspect of human endeav-
our, moral values actually impart on normative
stances (Zimmerman 2015). It seems true that moral-
ity appears through the objective affairs of the
observer, but quite naturally, morality is subject-
 centric as it depends on rational human beings, i.e.
morality supervenes on agents rather than on ob -
jects. Rawls (1971) considered that moral values look
for the preference of the agent, but not in the sense of
subjective preference, and stressed an internal
reflective method that rationally justifies values as a
general principle. Alternatively, we may stress the
constant interaction between subjectivity and inter-
subjectivity. One can spell out moral values as ‘inter-
subjective’. Although it is no doubt an intentional
state of the believers, morality in fact  centres around
what a subject believes (regarding moral values).
The subject’s belief inclines not only towards sub -
jectivity, but also towards objectivity and others’
choices, where subjective intentional states are refer-
entially interrelated to the objective world (Chakra -
borty 2017). In short, we impose values on the
objects, but to take them universally, we inflict a kind
of ‘collective illusion’ upon them. This socio-biologi-
cal thought is nourished by a Darwinian facet of
objectivity of ‘collective illusion’ (Ruse 1986) by way
of which we confirm moral values intersubjectively
so that subjective preferences play a pertinent role in
objective values.
HUMANOID ROBOTS AND THE IDEA OF
MORALITY
In 1956 (during a 2 month workshop at Dartmouth
College), computer scientist John McCarthy perhaps
first introduced the term ‘artificial intelligence’ (AI)
to articulate the study of intelligence in a computer
program that is proficient in thinking non-numeri-
cally (McCarthy & Minsky 2006). Later, McCarthy’s
high-level computer language (LISP) introduced in
the ‘MIT AI Lab Memo No 1’ (Arkin 1998) became a
prominent AI programming language. Humanoid
robots have been the monumental achievement in AI
since the 1980s. AI primarily challenges human intel-
ligence by introducing humanoid robots anchored in
the model of the human brain and cognition in order
to show how AI could go beyond human intelligence.
This research takes rationality as a capacity to weigh
a current measure against an ideal performance of a
cognitive machine (Russell & Norvig 2016). For these
authors, AI depends on the 4 categories of thinking
humanly, thinking rationally, acting humanly and
acting rationally. A system becomes rational if it goes
towards right things. AI researchers try to defend
these mentioned criteria intended for the conception
of the rationality of machines (Russell 1997). The cog-
nitive procedures of machines set up computer mod-
els of the brain like the human brain, as they aim to
promote artificial intelligence that can think humanly
(following cognitive ways) and accordingly act ration-
ally. The Turing test invents the representational
knowledge along with reasoning perusing a rational
agent (which may be the computer) to attain the best
outcome or good decisions of a ‘child machine’ (Tur-
ing 1950, p. 456). In this regard, Winston (1992)
stated, ‘The study of computations that make it possi-
ble to perceive, reason, and act.’ 
Now the critical question is: ‘What is a humanoid
robot?’ Humanoid robots are indeed not human
beings but have an exterior resemblance to humans.
AI induces humanoid robots that have extraterres-
trial life forms somewhat comparable to human
beings maintained by synthetic biology.1 Machine-
embodied cognition procedures control the seem-
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ingly human behaviours of humanoid robots. It is sig-
nificant to clarify here that humanoid robots can imi-
tate the human brain in terms of ‘thinking’, but the
concept of ‘mindfulness’ is beyond the ability of
humanoid robots, as the AI algorithms measure its
software and sensors that cannot grasp human con-
sciousness. The spectrum of the humanoid robot’s
thoughts is not in any way competing with the
 consciousness that can be computable. ‘Thinking
machine’ is a misnomer in the sense of being an intel-
ligent-rational individual. Russell & Norvig (2016,
p. 37) defined a rational agent as follows, ‘For each
possible percept sequence, a rational agent should
select an action that is expected to maximise its per-
formance measure, given the evidence provided by
the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowl-
edge the agent has.’ 
Therefore, this definition also dents the idea of
learning and autonomy of AI because an autonomous
rational agent can comprehend knowledge through
experience and argumentation that may surpass any
imposed or a priori knowledge. The quest for AI
returns to philosophy, as it looks for a module of the
human brain to find out how the mind works in the
realm of the physical brain, or what the decision-
making procedure is that calculates the utility of an
agent’s decision and some other related issues. My
aim here is not to stress the idea of the language
acquisition of humans and the machine language-
learning procedures in detail, since the main interest
of the paper is to emphasise the morality of AI or,
more specifically, the question: Can humanoid robots
be moral?
In philosophy, we like to see morality in the light of
human ‘intention’. ‘Intention’ is often understood as
an act guided by one’s choice or preference influ-
enced by desires, suitable both in humans and in
robotic systems as the module of machine advance.
However, the main question again is: Can humanoid
robots be moral? This is because the concept of
humanoid robots initiates the problem of AI that
becomes a conundrum for philosophers. The popular
stance of robots or humanoid robots disinclines any
intention or rationality in robots or humanoid robots,
so there is no question about the morality of humanoid
robots. Recent robotic science has claimed that
humanoid robots not only have choices, but they
have certain beliefs or degrees of beliefs comprised
through the numerical forms along with propositions
(Scassellati 2002). Bayesian diagnostic systems strive
to articulate robots’ beliefs in this way. Even behav-
iouristic psychology accomplishes this procedure by
introducing the technique of ‘reinforcement’ (Wilson
& Keil 1999). Behaviourist accounts insinuate the re -
inforcement of the robot representing behaviours by
replacing several goal-oriented processes that the
robots or humanoid robots intend to maintain. For the
behaviourist, the notion of the mind is as an informa-
tion-processing machine. Niv (2009, p. 330) wrote:
In recent years computational accounts of these two
classes of conditioned behavior have drawn heavily
from the framework of reinforcement learning (RL) in
which models all share in common the use of a scalar
reinforcement signal to direct learning. Importantly, RL
provides a normative framework within which to ana-
lyze and interpret animal conditioning. That is, RL mod-
els 1) generate predictions regarding the molar and
molecular forms of optimal behavior, 2) suggest a
means by which optimal prediction and action selection
can be achieved, and 3) expose explicitly the computa-
tions that must be realized in the service of these.
Here, the elemental question is: What is considered
‘thinking’? In short, thinking is a biological process
that only conscious human beings and animals can
perform. Thinking is doubtlessly allied to intelli-
gence. Similarly, ‘intelligence’ seems nothing but
some rationale-based decisions or choices that stand
for reality and has some argumentative grounds
behind it. Moreover, intelligence is a kind of toolbox
by which an agent can accomplish his/her aim. An
intelligent human being would not want to disobey
the set of rules or customs that a society has exten-
sively practiced. A creature that has intelligence can-
not perform anything without having a goal and can-
not comprehend something without having passions
and emotions. However, if we consider that hu -
manoid robots are moral, then the most pressing
question would be: Can humanoid robots think about
morality? We often incur the same question about
some of our fellow humans who appear careless
about moral principles but still enjoy life in their own
way within society. The argument is that humanoid
robots cannot be moral for the following 2 reasons:
(1) Humanoid robots cannot construct a distinction
between truth and justification regarding the con-
cepts of morality. Only human cognitive abilities can
ensure these concepts as they have to pass through a
lengthy history (socio-cultural based) and could learn
the knowledge through constant practices (in their
case of communication) that is highly lacking in
humanoid robots.
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1The biology of the machine is obviously maintained by
‘synthetic biology’, a quest for artificial designing of human
biological components or living organisms etc. See http://
hudsonrobotics.com/products/applications/synthetic-biol-
ogy/ (accessed 16 March 2018)
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(2) Davidson (2001) considered that the discrimina-
tion and the physical phenomenon of different
objects that relate to causal inputs rely on the crea-
tures’ perceptual capacities where not only percep-
tion is required, but ‘prerogative sentiment’ is also
necessary. Davidson hinted at a difference between
classification and discrimination. Classification is the
process where concept possession takes an impera-
tive role, and discrimination is the process that can
be applied to non-linguistic creatures. Davidson con-
sidered classification to be an anthropocentric pro-
cess, where to identify a concept is to classify its
objective properties, events etc. The concept of dis-
crimination is a sort of ‘disposition’ that is beyond any
normative force. Thus, the discriminating process
cannot recognise any informed mistake, as the crea-
ture does not have any knowledge relating to correct
and incorrect behaviours. Davidson (1984, p.170)
stated that ‘Someone cannot have a belief unless he
understands the possibility of being mistaken, and
this requires grasping the contrast between truth and
error − true belief and false belief.’ Humanoid robots
cannot grasp these processes and especially the con-
cepts of absurdity, rationality, frustration, sorrow and
all other human sentiments. Here, the problem is that
without these sentiments and intentional attitudes, it
would be difficult for a humanoid robot to concern
itself with morality. Davidson (1984) was correct
when he claimed that no one can have a belief about
an object or identify a belief as a belief without a
holistic web of beliefs. This thesis hints that without
having language and the causal history of reference,
a creature cannot insist on or construe a descriptive
thought.
AI researchers (especially Tanimoto 1987) think
that language is no longer a barrier for humanoid
robots. Computer translation and imagination might
take a prominent position in the history of our mod-
ern era. Therefore, creating a barrier between biolog-
ical and technological domains becomes less promi-
nent in our day-to-day life. However, it is doubtful
that a humanoid robot can recognise conceptual sys-
tems and will be able to develop new concepts
accordingly. Humanoid robots may have proto-con-
cepts, i.e. the concepts that they develop are quite
similar to human concepts. But in no way can they
grasp human concepts, as they do not pass through
the cultures and linguistic practices that educate a
human being on how to use words (creativity of lan-
guage use) and concepts in linguistic communica-
tion. Chomsky (1962), in reply to Harris (1951), stated
that a child (language learner) can hear the utter-
ances of the people correctly as ‘grammatical’ and
‘ungrammatical’ forms. A child develops his/her
grammar from the collective data that are satisfied
with some innate constraints. Putnam (2013, p. 758)
argued against this view: ‘The trouble with this view
is that the factual premise is false. People don’t object
to all and only ungrammatical sentences. If they
object at all, it is to deviant sentences — but they do
not, when they correct each other, clearly say (in a
way that a child can understand) whether the de -
viance was syntactic, semantic, discourse-theoretic
or whatever.’ 
Putnam (2013) challenged the Chomskyan view
that a child can extrapolate from the 2 lists of ‘grammat-
ical’ and ‘ungrammatical’ sentences. Putnam (2013)
showed that grammar is a property of language, not
something intrinsic that exclusively locates in the
speaker’s brain. He did so by defending in favour of
language as a system of strings with an inductive defi-
nition of predicates, that is easily parallel with seman-
tics, deductive logic and also inductive logic, whereas
grammar is a property of language. Putnam seems
right that a child does not like to learn a branch of syn-
tactic rules that looks very crazy. The ways of learning
‘semantic rules’ do not indicate any concern about the
uninterrupted strings of gestures. The learning pro-
cess of ‘semantic rules’ for a child can be possible in a
‘structure-dependent’ notion. A child can ‘internalise’
a structure-dependent rule and even be able to build
up an ‘inner representation’ of abstract structural no-
tions like sentences, verbs, nouns and so on in the
case of language acquisition. In Renewing Philosophy,
Putnam (1992, p. 15) claimed:
The view that language learning is not really learn-
ing, but rather the maturation of an innate ability in a
particular environment (somewhat like the acquisition
of a bird call by a species of bird that has to hear the call
from an adult bird of the species to acquire it, but which
also has an innate propensity to acquire that sort of call)
leads in its extreme form, to pessimism about the likeli-
hood that human use of natural language can be suc-
cessfully stimulated on a computer- which is why
Chomsky is pessimistic about projects for natural lan-
guage computer processing, although he shares the
computer model of the brain, or at least the ‘language
organ’ with AI researchers.
Putnam has foisted a misleading conception that he
called ‘innateness propensity’ about his critic Chom-
sky’s notable idea of ‘innate language’, while Chom-
sky argued that the computational model only works
for I-language (generative grammar) but not for lan-
guage use, as it has some productive senses. Lin-
guists like Chomsky consider that we can program I-
language and ‘universal grammar’ in the internal
processor of humanoid robots, as language is not
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fully innate. However, the faculty of language acqui-
sition is as innate as our visual faculty. The process of
language acquisition and the structure of grammar
are doubtlessly an innate-based biological adapta-
tion that no humanoid robots or machine can ever
achieve. There are good reasons for being sceptical
about computer modelling of language use, primarily
(but not solely) because of ‘the creative aspect of lan-
guage use’ (N. Chomsky pers. comm.).
MORALITY DOES NOT LOOK BACK TO
MECHANICAL MINDS, BUT TO CONSCIOUS
HUMAN BEINGS
Robotic scientists like Nick Bostrom and Ronald
Arkin, who struggle with superintelligence, are con-
cerned about its accuracy and philanthropic attitudes
towards moral values, so that the superintelligent hu-
manoid robots can certainly evaluate the best out-
comes in the case of any moral decision and benefit
human and non-human creatures. The robotic scien-
tist generally promotes the man−machine interface in
a more friendly way. The cultural dimension of man
and the atmosphere of machines are not similar, but
they both are engaged in the general welfare of the
community and the world. Like human activities, hu-
manoid robots’ acts have some social implications.
However, the idea of superintelligence, an advanced
version of AI, assures that we cannot anthropomor-
phise superintelligence in a productive sense. It is a
technologically advanced module for robots, super-
computers. The artificial minds of the superintelligent
humanoid robots may be able to copy the human
brain and more than that. The humanoid robots’ au-
tonomous agency that leads them to perform some
cognitive actions is entirely different (I suspect) from
human motivations. The reason is that humanoid ro-
bots do not have human-like psyches and cognitive
states. There may be some similar cognitive states
found between human beings and superintelligent
humanoid robots, but subjectivity (if we can call it the
‘inner conscious life of humanoid robots’) is very dif-
ferent from the human consciousness, as Bostrom
(2016) pointed out. Humanoid robots can have the
power of imitation and can follow the commands that
are installed in their software systems without being
guided by any self-understanding. Humanoid robots
do not have any emotion, conscience, rationality or
self-knowledge (privileged access) that can convey
any effect to their moral judgments.
Language acquisition and mathematical intelli-
gence rest on the process of maturation that one can
attain externally through reference borrowing and
linguistic practices. In our practical experience, we
see that 2 + 2 = 4, but there are some exceptions that
we (human beings only) may find, for example in the
case of liquids, where one drop plus one more drop of
water remains one as the drops unite with each other.
Robots are unable to pursue this kind of genuinely
mathematic-based intelligence. Machines only use
some adaptable commands that may quickly change
over time. Human beings can acquaint with this type
of exception, yet they learn the process of proper
counting (not fuzzy counting) just by eliminating the
mentioned exception from their thoughts. Accepting
the process will direct us towards the ‘descriptive
theory of morality’. This sounds problematic since it
does not fit with often used ‘thick ethical terms’ in
language, such as cruelty, emotion, love etc. The
important question is whether these terms sound like
fact-based concepts or normative concepts. I bor-
rowed the concept of ‘thick ethical terms’ from my
mentor Hilary Putnam’s excellent work The Collapse
of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002). Putnam (2002,
p. 35−36) wrote,
The sort of entanglement I have in mind becomes
obvious when we study words like ‘cruel’. The word
‘cruel’ obviously-or at least it is obvious to most people,
even if it is denied by some famous defenders of the
fact/value dichotomy-has normative and, indeed, ethi-
cal uses. If one asks me what sort of person my child’s
teacher is, and I say, ‘He is very cruel,’ I have both criti-
cised him as a teacher and criticised him as a man. I do
not have to add, ‘He is not a good teacher,’ or, ‘He is not
a good man.’ I might, of course, say ‘When he isn’t dis-
playing his cruelty he is a very good teacher’. But, I can-
not simply without distinguishing the respects in which
or, the occasions on which he is a good teacher; and, the
respects in which or, the occasions on which he is very
cruel and then say ‘He is a very cruel person and a very
good teacher.’ Similarly, I cannot simply say, ‘He is a
very cruel person and a good man,’ and be understood.
‘Cruel’ can also be used purely descriptively, as when a
historian writes that a certain monarch was exception-
ally cruel, or that the cruelties of the regime provoked
some rebellions. ‘Cruel’ simply ignores the supposed
fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be
sometimes used for a normative purpose and sometimes
as a descriptive term. (Indeed, the same is true of the
term ‘crime.’) In the literature, such concepts are often
referred to as ‘thick ethical concepts’. That the thick
ethical concepts are counterexamples to the idea that
there exists an absolute fact/value dichotomy has long
been pointed out, and the defenders of the dichotomy
have offered three central responses.
One may disagree with Putnam’s case of ‘cruel per-
son and a good teacher’, as the term ‘good’ can be
entirely descriptive in the sentence that ‘he is a cruel
person and a good teacher’. If an agent says ‘cruel
person and a good teacher’, then clearly the agent
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confers not much significance on the teacher’s emi-
nence, but that is possible. Most of these words have
purely descriptive uses. Some evaluative words have
an adjective like ‘outrageous’ or ‘admirable’ that may
have the same values. This is an unacceptable opin-
ion. Facts and beliefs are associated with the propo-
sitions that we classify as true or false. Values seem
quite unclear, but one could assert that they are stan-
dards for conveying good/bad verdicts to the states of
affairs signified by the propositions. In the case of
decision analysis or decision theory, these are repre-
sented as utility functions, which assign numbers
(utilities) to outcomes, analogously assigning proba-
bilities to beliefs. This is the way to carve up the
world; we impose this fact/value distinction on it, just
as we inflict other distinctions, such as choice options
vs. states of nature (things I control vs. the things I do
not control). Now the interesting query is that in the
case of humanoid robots, the conception of choice
takes different outlooks. Here, the society does not
instruct the processes that may control or are under
control of their choices. Actually, the robotic system
is controlled by programmed systems that have been
already inculcated or injected into the robots’ soft-
ware instructions. Rationality-based choices cannot
be suitable for robots, as they do not undergo the
framework of social life and customs that human
beings always exchange with each other. Another
point is that machines or humanoid robots cannot
expand their knowledge. Expanding knowledge re -
lates to the rationality and the subjectivity that
enhance a sort of creativity in it. No machine can
design the system independently.
Before entering into further debates, let me explain
the query that concerns ‘what makes intelligence
and consciousness possible?’ Intelligence seems
nothing but some rational centric decisions that cor-
respond to reality and have some argumentative
grounds behind them. Obviously, intelligence has
another criterion that follows the rules and social cus-
toms idiosyncratically. An intelligent being would not
want to violate the set of rules and customs that soci-
ety has extensively promoted. A creature that has
intelligence cannot serve anything without any
goals, passions and emotions. Pinker (1997, p. 60)
stated that:
Intelligence, then, is the ability to attain goals in the
face of obstacles using decisions based on rational
(truth-obeying) rules. The computer scientists Allen
Newell and Herbert Simon fleshed this idea out further
by noting that intelligence consists of specifying a goal,
assessing the current situation to see how it differs from
the goal, and applying a set of operations that reduce
the difference.
If we eliminate belief-desire from human behav-
iour like a behaviourist who believes in stimulus−
response theory, then the notion of thinking in
humanoid robots and even in human beings can be
under question. Consider a woman who runs out of
her flat. Scientific analyses of this incident can en -
sure us that she may have heard the fire alarm, saw
smoke and received a call from the security guard
who perhaps told her that the flat is on fire. Not all
physical incidents that are mapped by the physicist
can capture what is going on in the woman’s mind, as
the threat of fire may personally frighten her by
believing that ‘she is in danger’ now. If she believes
that a naughty child has set off the fire alarm or the
smoke spewed out of the kitchen when food was
being prepared or that the call that she received was
a prank, then she would not have left the flat and
obviously would be reluctant to believe that ‘she is in
danger’. Perhaps this is why all beliefs are somehow
mingled with the stimulus that can stimulate a person
to set a group of beliefs oriented around the probable
situations. It also shows that there are doubtlessly
physical incidents, but these physical incidents do
not underrate the importance of intuitive psychology
or belief-desire psychology of an agent. That is why
intelligence is attuned to the belief-desire psychol-
ogy of human beings that we cannot undermine.
Humans have the ability to respond to danger, mal-
adroit situations, all other things related to our phys-
ical world and especially the mental states like praise,
emotion, love, hate, beauty etc. that hu manoid robots
cannot, as they lack the explanatory tools like belief-
desire along with rationality or common sense. 
All of the mentioned tools that humans use are
derived from their social communications where
intuitive psychology plays a pertinent role. Let us
consider a case wherein I have received an invitation
from the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla,
for a talk at the Institute on the Philosophy of Hilary
Putnam in the coming month’s conference. The
authority of the institute has confirmed in the same
invitation that they will provide my air travel al -
lowance along with boarding and lodging facilities
for the 3 day conference. I persuasively inform the
institute that I happily accept their invitation and will
present my talk on Putnam’s ‘The Collapse of Fact/
Value Dichotomy’. Accordingly, on the mentioned
date, the organisers of the conference will arrange
everything for me. Now the question is that this com-
munication procedure between an invitee and the
organiser does not depend on any personal under-
standing of knowing each other or meeting in the
past. No scientific calculus can determine the preci-
54
Chakraborty: Can humanoid robots be moral?
sion of the conversation and can predict its conse-
quence. In fact, this is a sort of process allied to the
intuitive psychology that has some common sensual
understanding. If an institute invites a person for a
talk and the person accepts the invitation, then the
invitee will be present at the Institute on the pro-
posed date of the talk. There is a big clause that both
the institute authority and the invitee informally
know and admit, and that is the concept of ‘ceteris
paribus’ (‘all other things being equal’) clause that I
call ‘if and only if terms and conditions’. This clause
is informally assigned to the authority and the em -
ployer demands to be liable to obey his/her promises
if and only if all the surrounding conditions remain
favourable for him/her. These conditions do not in -
volve any unwanted accidents, medical crises of both
the speakers and organisers or the possibility of any
natural disasters, road strikes etc. that might avert a
person from fulfilling his/her promises. The process
that depends on the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause is strictly
an intuitive psychology-based science that Fodor
(1987) introduced in his work Psychosemantics. No
humanoid robot can grasp this process of intuitive
psychology that in volves the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause.
Another form of intelligence that the process of
communication expresses is ‘correspondence’ that
focusses on the meaningful states of the world, i.e.
the informative communication process has a rela-
tion to the meaningful states of the world and corre-
sponds suitably to the physical events and its config-
urations. A computer processor can maintain these
processes well. Alan Turing was the first thinker
who introduced these processes of ‘correspondence’
through an input−output system related to a machine
table. Putnam (1979, p. 300) mentioned the impor-
tance and non-importance of the ‘Turing machine’
and his theory of machine ‘functionalism’ in this way:
I think that machines have both a positive and nega-
tive importance. The positive importance of machines
was that it was in connection with machines, computing
machines in particular that the notion of the functional
organisation first appeared. Machines forced us to
 distinguish between an abstract structure and its con-
crete realisation. The distinction does not come to the
world for the first time with the machines. But in the
case of computing machines, we could not avoid rub-
bing our noses against the fact that what we had to
count as, to all intents and purposes the same structure
could be realised in a bewildering variety of different
ways; that the important properties were not physical-
chemical. That the machines made us catch on to the
idea of the functional organisation is extremely impor-
tant. The negative importance of machines, however,
is that they tempt us to oversimplification. The notion of
functional organisation became clear to us through sys-
tems with a very restricted, particular functional organ-
isation. So the temptation is present to assume that we
must have that restricted and specific kind of functional
organisation.
Mathematical equations or rational−functional ma -
chines can expressively correspond to the rules of
mathematics and logic by carrying rational thoughts
(based on grammatical sentences by following the
rules and norms of the communication procedures)
comparable with the human brain. These commer-
cial procedures rely on artificial intelligence that has
a model of the human brain. It distinctively chal-
lenges the human mind and human intelligence.
John Searle’s prominent argument against the artifi-
cial intelligence theory was given the name ‘Chinese
room argument’ (Searle 1980) and very clearly and
argumentatively elucidates that understanding of the
sense of an extension of human intelligence can in no
way be compared to manipulation of the symbols that
humanoid robots perform. The program systems
(internal software of the AI, machine or humanoid
robots) fail to grasp any intentionality that is the best
weapon of human intelligence in their process of
communication and thoughts.
The most attractive part of the debate emerges
when we are concerned about the concept of human
language. The biological process of communication
and the productivity of the thoughts secure the best
challenge against AI or humanoid robots. Language
is the medium that helps communication among
intelligent social beings where imagination, experi-
ence and social interface remain engaged with sig-
nificant roles. Computer models and humanoid ro -
bots can only generate propositional calculus and
internal language (generative grammar2 as Chomsky
claimed and symbols that mathematicians or logi-
cians uphold), but humanoid robots cannot pursue
the creative use of the language of common sense.
The propositional calculus-oriented computer sys-
tems become deviant as they preserve common
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2Chomsky (1980) defined ‘generative grammar’ by stating
that language is a set of sentences that is generated by
grammar. The number of words in our vocabulary is lim-
ited, but because of the generative grammar we can con-
struct unlimited grammatical sentences. This is a sort of log-
ical structure of language that we may call grammar, which
preserves certain numbers of recursive rules. According to
Chomsky (1980, p. 220), ‘The grammar of the language de-
termines [the] properties of each of the sentences of the lan-
guage...Language is the set of sentences that are described
by the grammar...When we speak of the linguist’s grammar
as a ‘generative grammar’, we mean only that it is suffi-
ciently explicit to determine how sentences of the language
are in fact characterized by the grammar.’
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sense or socio-linguistic background that previous
computer systems didn’t have. Their inductive mod-
ule systems sort out the propositional calculus by cor-
responding to the intrinsic grammar or logical sym-
bols that mainly manipulate their interpreted system
processes. Moreover, the genetic-based language
faculty strongly produces ‘creativity of language,’ a
process that I believe partly depends on the propen-
sity of innateness and partly on the agent− world rela-
tion which is lacking in any other organisms (like
robots, computers etc.) except human beings.
Dennett (2012) argued that when we claim that a
person knows, we spell out that a person knows
something or specify precisely a few things that he
knows. However, this specification depends on some
indefinite numbers of assumptions. In the ordinary
sense, the term ‘know’ refers to ‘know as true. It may
well be possible that an agent can claim to know a
proposition as P, but this P (proposition) somehow
turns out as false. Here, the twist is that the agent had
a belief of P, but he did not know that P properly. The
procedure of knowing depends on the psychological
states like truth, justification, beliefs, etc. that we
may call the second-order belief of an agent. Dennett
cautioned that there are some cases where we find
incompatibility between the 2 different notions of
knowledge − truth conditions and the knowledge of
belief. Dennett (2012, p. 202−203) claimed that:
When called upon to produce one’s knowledge one
can do no better than to produce what one believes to
be true, and whether or not what one believes to be true
is true does not affect it being one of those things one
will produce as knowledge when asked, or will other-
wise act on as if one knew them… A thing (a fact or
proposition or whatever) could not occupy a special psy-
chological position (e.g. have a special functional poten-
tial in the direction of behaviour) in virtue of its truth, so
knowing something cannot be purely a matter of being
in a particular psychological state.
Here, the process of knowing depends on 2 different
tasks. First, we need to determine what a person
knows or exhibits as knowledge; then our task would
be which of these can be true. Secondly, we have in
our mind that a person can be regarded as a store of
information and misinformation.
Now the query is: ‘Can we specify the content of an
agent’s store with any precision?’ Following Dennett,
we can argue that the storage of information is not
only the constitutive part of knowing of an agent
because the libraries and dictionaries have lots of
stored information, but they are unaware of these
facts. The notable claim of Dennett raised in favour of
‘knowing’ is that ‘knowing requires understanding’
(Dennett 2012, p. 204) and understanding of a word
does not rely on the understanding of sentences.
Moreover, it may even be possible that one can
understand a sentence without understanding the
person’s utterances or saying. The ability to produce
paraphrases is a procedure to understand a sentence,
because a computer program can certainly produce
paraphrases of English to translate into Bengali sen-
tences. However, the process does not show that
computers can understand the sentences. In the case
of a computer, although it has some verbal connec-
tion (input−output systems), it lacks acquaintance
with the object to which the word referred. The pro-
cess of the conceptual scheme and the perceptual
apparatus does not work with a computer. Dennett
(2012), in the process of understanding, gives impor-
tance to the concept of behavioural capacities of an
agent. If an agent X claims that ‘Y (another person) is
here’, it shows that the person must be able to assert
and know the other consequences like ‘Y is a friend
of X’ and the term ‘here’ means in town or not in
another place, etc. It sounds true that there may be
some cases where the first-order belief (word-object
related belief) is wrong, yet the second-order belief
(like ‘I believe that whales are fishes’) turns out to be
true. This is because it does not depend on the refer-
ential relation to the object of the world, as the agent
is the first-person authority of his/her beliefs. More-
over, the conceptual apparatus of the agent has priv-
ileged access to the particular knowledge. It may
well be possible that here the content of the particu-
lar beliefs may turn out to be false (whales are indeed
mammals), but the believer’s beliefs remain un -
changed. A third person may justifiably critique the
content of the agent’s particular belief, but the third
person has no direct knowledge (without inference)
of the agent’s particular belief like ‘whales are fishes’
whether the agent is believing or deceiving himself
by believing that ‘whales are fishes’. No humanoid
robots can ever acquire this sort of non-inferential
and first-person based sound knowledge of an agent.
There may be the conceptual device of the brain
that is linked to our thinking parts (intrinsic or inter-
nal part of the brain), but the language device of the
brain makes the ‘thinking about thinking’ possible,
as language represents what is going on in the mind
(skin in) outside of the physical boundary of the
 subject. The concept of shareability challenges the
idea of intrinsic concepts that preserve the a priori
hypothesis. The mutual understanding, interpretabil-
ity and interchangeability of the concepts felicitate
language as a social art, and humanoid robots have
no privilege to interact with the social art of lan-
guage, as they have no causal  history or lifeworld.
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The Nagelean model seems interesting because of its
biological-cum-theoretical approaches to ethics. Nagel
(2013, p. 146) seemed inventive when he claimed:
Ethics, though more primitive, is similar. It is the
result of a human capacity to subject innate or condi-
tioned pre-reflective motivational and behavioural pat-
terns to criticism and revision and to create new forms
of conduct. The capacity to do this presumably has
some biological foundation. But the history of the exer-
cise of this capacity and its continual reapplication in
criticism and revision of its products is not part of biol-
ogy. Biology may tell us about perceptual and motiva-
tional starting points, but in its present state it has little
bearing on the thinking process by which these starting
points are transcended.
Certain biological approaches are based on the be -
havioural patterns that are adapted to human emo-
tions and motivation. The theoretical approaches to
ethics instead rely on the methods of rational criti-
cism and justification. It sounds true that the biologi-
cal pattern-based ethics would endure the develop-
ment processes with constant reassessment and
rectification of the previous experiences, as it intends
to trace a deeper attitude of understanding. An agent
who would like to engage in this cannot be an automa-
ton that only produces decisions or results, but the
agent has the capabilities of rational choice and criti-
cal thought directed by common sense- oriented
behavioural psychology. Critical thoughts and ration-
ality intermingle with the biological resources like
emotion, motivation, absurdity etc. This intermingled
process leads to a sharp demarcation be tween the
conception of the morality of robots and human
beings. Humans’ pre-reflective intuition-based beliefs
are not only conjecturing numbers of mathematics
but apply reason and formulate different methods
that express the creative aspects of the human brain
from a biological-cum-theoretical base. This process
of rationality-based reasoning is exclusively deter-
mined partly by the individual brain and partly by
society or the background history of the individual.
No humanoid can grasp this method, as it has no
motivation, which is ruled by rationality and common
sense.
WHY NOT HUMAN ETHICS?
Indeed, critical thought and rationality interact
with the conscious−biological resources. This inter-
mingled process constructs a sharp demarcating line
between the conception of the morality of humanoid
robots and human beings. Humans’ pre-reflective
intuition-based beliefs not only think about the num-
bers of mathematics, but may also consider common
sense by formulating different methods that cohere
with the creative aspects of the human brain from a
biological-cum-theoretical level. No humanoid robots
can grasp this method, as they have no conscious-
ness-related rational intention, which is controlled by
rationality and ingenious practical intelligence. AI
tries to show that the intelligence-cum-mentality is
somehow related to computational machines; hence,
we may say computers have minds. It looks like an
amazing achievement for a thinking machine. How-
ever, there is a keen difference between the concep-
tions of ‘in principle’ and ‘in practice’. Human beings
have some creative and flexible behaviour that de -
pends on the functional capacities of ‘knowing how’
processes, which a computer cannot grasp. The ‘intel-
ligence’ that a machine possesses is nothing more
than injected intelligence, and the ‘knowledge’ that a
machine expresses is a kind of ‘knowing that’ knowl-
edge (in a descriptive sense), like 2+2=4. Lady Ada
Lovelace interestingly argued, ‘The Analytical
Engine has no pretensions to originate anything. It
can do whatever we know how to order it to perform’
(Turing 1950, p. 450).
In fact, moral values cannot be fully attained
through social interaction; basically, conscience or
morality is something deeply ingrained in our self-
realisation and understanding, an inner part of the
mind that is called responsibility. Responsibility is an
anthropocentric construct that strictly relates to the
conception of self-ascription and other-ascription. If
we place morality in the realm of objectivity and fig-
ure out its universal stand setting on lives and soci-
ety, then the human-made conception of values that
has some fact-centric experiences must interact with
the subject’s choices. This process averts the expedi-
tion of artificial intelligence to threshold into the field
of intended responsible morality and its quest for
subjectivity and objectivity.
My philosophical view of ‘person’ is enriched by
Singer’s (1979) startling remarks on ‘person’ that
refers to a being with ‘personal identity’, whereas
most animals, foetuses and even infants are not ‘per-
sons’ per se, although they do have relevant experi-
ences. Non-persons are morally germane because, in
Bentham’s (2000) phrase, they can endure pain and
suffering. Bentham (2000, p. 37) wrote, ‘The pleas-
ures of malevolence are the pleasures resulting from
the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the
beings who may become the objects of malevolence:
to wit, 1. Human beings. 2. Other animals.’ However,
they are no more than ‘experience machines’, so that,
if we reinstate one with another then we have done
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no impairment. The question of ruling out children
and animals not only shows that they do not have
propositional attitudes, but they cannot be regarded
as a ‘person’ who has moral conscience. The same
thing would be applied to humanoid robots. I differ
from Singer (1979) and Bentham (2000) as I mean to
put identity as a sort of theory of the self, arising from
a person’s theory of their history and projecting into
the future, creating goals and values explicit to that
person. An example of this sort of constructing values
is the decision to become a leader, which cannot be
made merely by considering one’s existing prefer-
ences because one knows that one’s preferences will
alter as a result of one’s decision. The same goes for
the choice of a career or job. The conception of
morality confers to the linguistic human being in -
stead of the non-linguistic humanoid robots. It looks
motivating that the moral conscience is partly a priori
based attitudes that are linked to us biologically and
we partly have attained it through social interactions
and practices. Morality cannot be fully attained from
society and others; morality is something deeply
ingrained in our self-realisation and understanding,
an inner matter of mind. However, it looks promising
that ‘conscience is part of what docility is about’ as
Jonathan Baron (pers. comm.) argued. Docility is a
propensity to be influenced by others. Docility is not
only associated with the linguistic personality, but it
is also allied to non-linguistic personalities, like deaf
children. Personality is in no way associated with
humanoid robots, as they do not have any moral
sense, and they are indeed docile automata who
have no potency to be influenced by other machines.
The programs that are installed in their software only
can manipulate the robots devoid of any realising
sagacity.
Morality emphasises on moral responsibility that
is not an outward practice (or ‘output’, in the case of
humanoid robots) of an agent, but a sort of thought
(internal part) that only a rational and a responsible
intentioned human being can perform. Responsibil-
ity is something that is strictly linked to the concep-
tion of self-ascription and other-ascription. If we
place morality in the realm of objectivity and figure
out its universal stand setting on lives and society,
then the human-made conception of values that has
some fact-centric experience must interact with the
subjects’ choices. This process thwarts the expedi-
tion of artificial intelligence to threshold into the
field of intended responsible morality and its quest
for subjectivity and objectivity. Here, the major
question — Can humanoid robots be moral? — is de -
ciphered from the normative outlook where morality
underpins a human-centric outlook instinctively.
Humanoid ro bots are able to differentiate between
the ‘right-making’ and ‘wrong-making’ properties
of moral values through their sensor, but the idea of
liberty, justice, equality, open society, post-mod-
ernism etc. etymologically are not attainable and
configured by the sensor or monitor related to deci-
sion-making procedures like a humanoid robot.
These conceptions originate from human feelings,
rationality and reasoning. Moreover, the principle of
universal applicability of intersubjective stance on
moral values could not be followed by robotic intel-
ligence, as a robot cannot attain the concept of ‘oth-
erness’ and the relation between the subjective,
objective and inter-subjectivity.
CONCLUSION
Let us assume that some humanoid robots have a
moral conscience and consequently can discriminate
between right and wrong. The humanoid robots do
not think that they have moral conscience, as they
probably lack the experiences of seeing, feeling and
reasoning that causes them to act.3 Let us be hopeful
like Arkin (1998) that some robots have a moral con-
science and consequently can discriminate between
right and wrong. We can programme humanoid robots
to display empathy and an accurate sense of right
and wrong. Humanoid robots (in particular sense) do
not think or self-realise as a first-person authority
that they have moral conscience as they probably do
not have the experiences of realisation, self-knowl-
edge, and humanistic feeling that would cause them
to act intentionally and rationally. Eliminating moral-
ity from humans elevates the concept of morality that
could be maintained by robotic AI, and that is in no
way an easy task.
Here, the key question is: Can we reconstruct
moral ethics and values in favour of humanoid robots
so that the gap between the theoretical and practical
differences can be marginalised? We know that the
morality of the agents (human beings) and their moti-
vation towards a moral sense frequently become irre-
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3Rene Descartes is credited (by Haldane & Ross 1934, p. 116)
with stating that ‘For while reason is a universal instrument
which can serve for all contingences, these (mechanical) or-
gans have need of some special adaptation for every partic-
ular action. From this it follows that it is morally impossible
that there should be sufficient diversity in any machine to
allow it to act in all the events of life in the same way as our
reason causes us to act’
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sponsible, inconsistent, confusing and subject-cen-
tric choices etc. However, the process would be
highly challenging, as morality is not a mere inter-
nalised structure of personal experience or subjective
choices. Morality promotes the culture and customs
of our past generations and becomes somewhat static
because of their content and evaluation that are
highly accepted and followed by the majority of peo-
ple from generation to generation. One cannot step
beyond the life-world framework because of the con-
straint of language and thought. Frank Wilczek,
Nobel laureate in physics, wrote, ‘Artificial intelli-
gence is not the product of an alien invasion. It is an
artefact of particular human culture and reflects the
values of that culture’ (Wilczek 2015, p. 122).
This is an appealing point that is indeed accept-
able. One can say that without depending on the
model of human values and moral conscience, it is
implausible to prompt any ethical conducts or moral
conscience for humanoid robots. The interesting
point seems to me is that if we inject rational moral
agency and autonomous creativity into humanoid
robots, then we cannot treat them as a means. We
should treat it as an end. Here, the problem is that
humanoid robots need to be responsible for their
actions as they are bound by the moral codes and
conducts of our society. We know that self-interest
can be at variance with other interests. Their pres-
ence would elevate the question of whether they
should be responsible for their self-interest-intended
acts. Artificial ethics should accept responsibilities,
and humanoid robots should be the first-person
authority of their actions. Humanoid robots can
hardly think of themselves as autonomous agents!
Morality is not merely the following of codes and
conducts, but it requires some motives (intentions) to
produce the conducts or rules independently that no
humanoid robots can perform.
However, one thing that computer scientists can do
is modify human ethics by discarding vagueness and
puzzling moral norms. Humanoid robots are unable
to think for themselves or for human beings from a re-
sponsible ground, as they do not have any aspiration
or self-awareness and responsibility that can evolve
their intelligence. Humanoid robots need to be
morally and culturally systematic, empathetic and
embryonic like moral human beings, but they should
not follow the internal inadequacy of human ethics. If
computer scientists construct superintelligent moral
humanoid robots, then I am afraid of the extent of
their ‘creative capacities’. The conception of ‘creativ-
ity’ resumes when there is a strong list of alternative
options like good and bad, moral and immoral, con-
struction and destruction, harm, help etc. We may call
someone a moral agent when the person constantly
performs moral actions, but s/he has the alternative
possibilities to also perform immoral actions. If we
program software for every good possibility into su-
perintelligent moral humanoid robots by claiming
that a humanoid robot will perform only good moral
actions for the benefit of society and the environment,
then it would be impractical to say that humanoid ro-
bots have any creative sense or are moral agents.4
Humanoid robots may take over the task more ele-
gantly and error-free than humans. Nevertheless, we
should not map out this sort of dehumanising quest as
a key impulsion to innovation; rather, human innova-
tion depends on the improvement of the ability to
think and do more reasonable tasks guided by moral
values and responsibility. Saudi Arabia can offer citi-
zenship to Sophia (www.independent.co.uk/ life-style/
gadgets-and-tech/news/saudi-arabia-robot-sophia-
citizenship-android-riyadh-citizen-passport-future-
a8021601.html), one of the latest humanoid robots,
but should not contravene human laws and ethical
paradigms for the sake of humanoid robots. Indeed,
the ‘technological providence’ of humanoid robots
has no liable sense or the first-person authority over
their actions which we can blame or punish for not
following state laws.
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